The recent reshuffle at the top levels of the National Police (Polri) has triggered a wave of speculation, concern, and quiet recalculations within the country’s law enforcement and political ecosystem. While the official telegram (ST/1764/VIII/KEP./2025) issued by the Police Headquarters describes the moves as routine, the context and choices suggest a deeper political subtext.

In a year marked by sweeping budget cuts across the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the government has nonetheless accelerated the transformation of nine State Islamic Institutes (IAIN) into State Islamic Universities (UIN). This paradox has raised eyebrows.

Many people would agree that Hasto Kristiyanto’s and Tom Lembong’s cases are both heavily influenced by political motives. When President Prabowo Subianto granted the two figures amnesty and abolition, one might expect his action to appease the public, but their reactions suggest otherwise.

The 2024 Tolerant City Index (IKT) released by Setara Institute places cities like Parepare, Cilegon, and Lhokseumawe at the bottom. The national average score has also declined from 5.06 to 4.92, highlighting that the effort to strengthen tolerance remains a major challenge—especially for local governments at the bottom of the list.

President Prabowo Subianto granted a legal amnesty to Hasto Kristiyanto, the secretary-general of PDIP convicted of bribery in the Harun Masiku case, and issued an abolition to Thomas Lembong, former Trade Minister convicted in a sugar import corruption case  The DPR swiftly approved the petitions affecting 1,116 convicts overall — on grounds including national unity, humanitarian considerations, and in the spirit of 80th Independence Day.

In the past few months, Universitas Kristen Satya Wacana (UKSW) in Salatiga has found itself engulfed in an institutional crisis—one that echoes the darkest chapters in its academic history. What began as a sudden and unilateral dismissal of Prof. Dr. Umbu Rauta and his team from the Faculty of Law has now revealed a broader pattern of administrative overreach, institutional silence, and what some students call “campus rule by shadow power.”

Home Affairs Minister Tito Karnavian’s proposal resurfaced from the halls of Parliament: tripling public funding for political parties, from Rp1,000 to Rp3,000 per vote. It reflects a dangerous trajectory in Indonesian politics: the institutionalization of greed through legal means. What we are witnessing is Serakahnomics in politics—a practice where the ruling elite rationalize the capture of public resources for their own consolidation.

In recent years, the Alliance of Indonesian Student Executive Bodies (BEM SI) has been a beacon of hope amidst uncertainty in the future of this country. It encourages not only students, but also civilians all across Indonesia to join hands in voicing concerns about government policies that are potentially harmful. But now it appears that the alliance itself has been divided.

The court has recently declared former Minister of Trade (2015-2016), Thomas “Tom” Trikasih Lembong, guilty in the alleged sugar import corruption case. This verdict set off a backlash not only from his supporters, but also legal experts and the general public. Many of them sense potential criminalization in the judicial proceedings of this case.