The arrest of Riau Governor Abdul Wahid by KPK  has again reminded how fragile provincial governance can be when power collides with patronage. Wahid, a newly inaugurated governor from the National Awakening Party (PKB), was detained together with nine other officials during a sting operation linked to infrastructure projects under the provincial Public Works and Spatial Planning Office. Cash was reportedly confiscated.

Ministry of Communication and Digital (Komdigi) announced that it was “studying China’s influencer certification model.”  It appeared to many as a well-intentioned move to combat misinformation and promote accountability among content creators. Should influence be licensed by the state?

When Rahayu Saraswati Djojohadikusumo — the niece of President Prabowo Subianto — announced her resignation from the House of Representatives, it was initially framed as an act of moral responsibility. Her name had been dragged into public criticism amid debates over nepotism and political dynasties, and the gesture seemed to symbolize integrity — a rare commodity in Indonesia’s contemporary political landscape.

When Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY) described West Java’s Kertajati International Airport as “big, beautiful, and grand—but in the middle of nowhere,” it immediately sparked public attention. To many, it sounded like a blunt critique of one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects launched under Jokowi’s administration. But in politics, words rarely mean only what they say.

Indonesia is currently in the process of negotiation and bidding for land acquisition for the promised Hajj Village (“Kampung Haji”) in Makkah, Saudi Arabia. This project aims to reduce the soaring cost of Hajj and to shorten the long queue, with the hope of starting operations in 2028, ahead of the 2029 elections. It is good news for the prospective pilgrims, but there are always concerns surrounding large-scale projects with a big budget, and the Hajj Village is no exception.

Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa’s seemingly harmless remark—“President Jokowi is a bit right”—about the Jakarta–Bandung high-speed train (WHOOSH) may, in fact, be part of a larger political choreography.

When the National Nutrition Agency (BGN) announced that creators of positive viral content about the Makan Bergizi Gratis (Free Nutritious Meal) program could earn Rp 5 million, it might have sounded like an innovative communication strategy. In reality, however, it reflects a deeper issue within public policy — the growing tendency to engineer public opinion rather than to earn public trust through performance.

When Hasan Nasbi, the former head of the Presidential Communication Office (PCO) who was reshuffled only a few months ago by President Prabowo Subianto, publicly criticized Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa for being “too self-righteous,” the remark at first seemed like a passing comment in Jakarta’s noisy political discourse. Yet beneath its surface lies a deeper story — a clash between two presidencies, two communication doctrines, and possibly, two competing circles of influence shaping Indonesia’s post-Jokowi era.

When Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa replaced Sri Mulyani Indrawati as Finance Minister in September, few predicted he would so quickly dominate the political conversation. Within weeks, the once-reserved technocrat began delivering bold, almost combative public statements—taking on import mafias, regional officials, even Pertamina’s top brass. Suddenly, Purbaya was no longer a quiet economist; he was a political story.

When President Prabowo Subianto declared that Portuguese should be taught in schools, the announcement came draped in diplomatic symbolism. Delivered during the state visit of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva at the Merdeka Palace, it was a flourish designed to project Indonesia’s global ambition — a gesture of friendship toward Brazil and a subtle signal that Prabowo seeks to reorient Indonesia’s diplomacy toward the Global South.