Recently, Prabowo Subianto once again touted Indonesia’s free nutritious meal program (MBG), praising the country for surpassing Brazil in the number of recipients. He pointed out that while Brazil took 11 years to reach 40 million recipients, Indonesia exceeded 55 million in less than a year. However, this comparison raises important questions: Are the two programs truly comparable in terms of objectives, quality, and sustainability? More importantly, does the rapid expansion of MBG reflect genuine success that is worthy of pride?

The Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) has officially named John Herdman as the head coach, marking a new phase for Indonesian national football that emphasizes not only immediate results but also long-term development of young talent. However, the question remains: Is a change in coaching leadership alone enough to drive meaningful improvements and achieve these ambitions?

Indonesia’s decision to establish a dedicated Ministry of Hajj and Umrah was hailed as a landmark reform. For decades, the management of Hajj affairs had been fragmented across institutions, often burdened by bureaucracy, inconsistent coordination, and recurring service complaints. The new ministry was expected to centralize authority, improve efficiency, and professionalize the handling of one of the most sensitive religious services in the country. Yet barely a year after its formation, the crisis surrounding Hajj Khusus 2026 has revealed how fragile this promise remains.

In recent years, especially 2025, youth-led protests erupted in many countries. Young people, often referred to as the “Gen Z”, joined hands to challenge corruption, economic inequality between political elites and citizens, and governance failures. Indonesia was no exception. With the help of social media as a unique tool for their activism, this generation has repeatedly managed to spark political debates. It might escalate into a full-fledged uprising if the ruling government keeps underestimating them in the coming year.

The renewed push by Gerindra to revive indirect local elections—allowing governors, mayors, and regents to be selected by local legislatures (DPRD) instead of citizens—has reignited an old debate that Indonesia thought it had settled a decade ago. The argument being sold to the public sounds pragmatic: elections are expensive, polarizing, and prone to money politics. But beneath the rhetoric of “efficiency” lies a more troubling political ambition—one that risks shrinking democratic space and returning power to the hands of party elites.

Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) has reconciled—at least formally. The leadership feud that threatened Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization has been folded neatly under the reassuring banner of islah. Statements of unity have been delivered. Photos of brotherhood have circulated. And the public has been told that NU is once again “solid.”

Indonesia’s late-December decision to reshuffle 187 senior officers within the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) is officially justified as part of routine regeneration and structural strengthening. On paper, it is a normal institutional exercise. But in a political context where the military’s role is increasingly scrutinized, such a massive rotation inevitably carries implications beyond internal management. This is not simply about who occupies which post; it is about the direction, priorities, and mindset of one of the country’s most powerful institutions.

The National Nutrition Agency (BGN) has once again emphasized that the MBG program is not mandatory during school holidays. Schools and students may choose to opt out of the program if they wish, while those who opt in will have to pick up the meals at school every three days. But here’s the thing: BGN’s claims didn’t correspond with the public’s self-reported MBG experiences as seen on social media.

TNI Chief of Staff Maruli Simanjuntak and Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya were condemned for their remarks on media coverage of the recent Sumatra disaster. They advised the media against reporting the government’s shortcomings in disaster relief, and to focus on boosting public morale with positive news. More than a simple advice, however, AJI Indonesia viewed it as an effort to curb the media’s role as a watchdog.

Nearly a month after floods and landslides hit three provinces in Sumatra, thousands of evacuees have yet to receive adequate assistance. 500 tonnes of humanitarian aid from our neighbor Malaysia stuck in Port Klang without approval, while 30 tonnes of rice were almost returned to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). It all boils down to the uncertainty in the Indonesian government’s bureaucracy, which effectively locks foreign assistance out of the country.