President Prabowo Subianto’s decision to appoint 16 members of the Dewan Energi Nasional (DEN) is more than a ceremonial act. It offers a clear signal of how his administration intends to govern one of Indonesia’s most strategic sectors: energy will be managed through centralized authority, political continuity, and institutional caution rather than disruptive reform.

Sekolah Rakyat or People’s Schools, one of Prabowo Subianto’s flagship programs, continue to increase in number. As of today, 166 schools in 34 provinces across Indonesia have begun operations, with the construction of 104 additional schools targeted for completion this year. The recruitment of PPPK workers to support the program has also been finalized. However, key challenges remain, particularly in land provision and student enrollment.

House’s decision to appoint a sitting senior politician as a judge of the Constitutional Court is not merely a personnel matter. It is a direct test of the country’s commitment to the separation of powers—and one that risks eroding public trust in constitutional justice.

The recurring proposal to place Indonesia’s police force under a ministry is often sold as a cure for politicization. Its supporters argue—correctly—that keeping the police directly under the President creates an inherent conflict of interest. A President is a political actor, backed by a coalition, with electoral incentives. Expecting the police to remain fully neutral under such an arrangement, they say, is naïve.

Floods have once again inundated Jakarta and its surrounding cities. Over the past few days, heavy rainfall has paralyzed traffic, disrupted public transportation, and pushed several floodgates into alert status. But this isn’t just a matter of extreme weather. The annual flooding also raises questions about the city’s urban planning.

New revelations from Pati show that the arrest of Regent Sudewo was not the result of isolated misconduct, but the exposure of a system deliberately engineered to extract rents from the lowest level of government. According to investigators, money was not collected directly by the regent, but through trusted intermediaries—local strongmen, village heads and political fixers—tasked with gathering “contributions” in exchange for access to public office.

The arrest of Pati Regent Sudewo in a sting operation conducted by Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) should not be viewed as an isolated legal incident. It reflects a broader failure of political accountability at the local level, where public complaints were ignored, institutional checks weakened and executive power operated with minimal restraint.

Gerakan Rakyat, a mass organization promoting Anies Baswedan for the presidency, has officially declared its transformation into a political party beginning this year. Given the current electoral laws and Indonesia’s fluid political landscape, how might this new party perform in the 2029 elections?

Indonesia might soon amend its Constitution to change its political system from republic to a kingdom. The House of Representatives (DPR), which is fully controlled by the big tent ruling coalition, will first change election system for regional leaders (governors, regents, and mayors).

Indonesia’s political calendar has barely moved on from the 2024 election, yet two new parties have already entered the stage. The declarations of the Gerakan Rakyat Party and the Gema Bangsa Party in the past few days are being framed as signs of democratic vitality. In reality, they offer a more sobering reflection of Indonesia’s enduring political weakness: the dominance of personality over institutions.